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The state and illegality in Indonesia
In July 2007, at the height of a government military operation against sepa-
ratist rebels in the Indonesian province of Aceh, a short but curious article 
appeared in the local newspaper.1 It quoted the Aceh military commander, 
Major General Endang Suwarya, warning members of the public not to be 
hoodwinked if they received a telephone call from someone claiming to be 
him and asking for money. Apparently, a group of swindlers had been tele-
phoning rich people in the province, with one first pretending to be Endang’s 
adjutant. After ascertaining the identity of the person being called, the ‘ad-
jutant’ would hand over the telephone to ‘the commander’ who would then 
ask for hundreds of millions of rupiah in order to help pay for the military 
operation. A number of local officials and businesspeople had apparently 
already fallen for the trick, and transferred large sums to the bank accounts 
in Jakarta nominated by the swindlers. Endang was angry: ‘For as long as 
I’ve been serving here, I have never telephoned anyone to borrow or ask for 
money.’2 Yet this was not the first time, nor the last, that confidence tricksters 
had pretended to be members of the security forces in order to extort money 
from people in Aceh; on the contrary, there have been repeated reports of in-
dividuals pretending to be police officers, army soldiers or agents of the State 
Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Negara, BIN) for this purpose.3 
There is, of course, an unspoken irony in such stories. Here we have ordi-
nary civilians engaging in what are apparently acts of pure criminality that 
do not involve abuse of state office or misuse of state funds, but in order to do 
so, they find it most convenient to imitate corrupt state officials. Everybody 
involved apparently takes it for granted that this act of imitation is logical, 
even crafty. Neither the military officers being imitated, nor the police officers 
in charge of investigations, nor those being swindled, nor the reporters, ques-
1 Small parts of this introductory chapter are based on Van Klinken 2008. The authors thank Ian Wilson, 
Howard Dick, Ross McLeod and Robert Cribb, and the two anonymous reviewers, for their very helpful 
comments on earlier versions.
2 ‘Mayjen Endang Suwarya dicatut untuk memeras’, Serambi Indonesia 22-7-2003.
3 See for example ‘Rekan tersangka BIN gadungan dipanggil polisi’, Serambi Indonesia 27-6-2007; ‘Coba 
memeras geuchik, lima BIN gadungan dibekuk di Langsa’, Serambi Indonesia 22-4-2009.
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tion the effectiveness of the trick. And little wonder: the swindle is entirely 
plausible. Everyone in Aceh at the time of the story described above knew 
that military personnel were involved in all sorts of extortion rackets, as well 
as engaging in a variety of other ‘off-budget’ fundraising techniques, involv-
ing skimming off money from government development budgets, extracting 
protection payments from large companies, and participating in all manner 
of legal and semi-legal activities ranging from the marijuana trade to illegal 
logging. Ordinary soldiers and policemen routinely demanded payments 
from drivers of vehicles who drove through their checkpoints, or they stole 
money, household goods, livestock and other valuables from ordinary citi-
zens’ homes and farms when they raided villages in their hunt for separatist 
rebels. Hence the logic of the swindle: in order to be a criminal, so it seems, 
it helps if you are first a state official, or at least can pretend to be one. And 
although such swindles were especially common in Aceh, where the secu-
rity forces were until recently an overwhelming presence, they also occur 
throughout Indonesia. National and regional newspapers frequently run sto-
ries about extortion scams by ‘fake police’ (polisi gadungan), fake soldiers, fake 
intelligence agents, fake prosecutors, fake anti-corruption commissioners and 
many other varieties of fake state officials.4
Empirical and theoretical starting points
The concept of legality is inherent in the modern concept of the state. It is the 
state that defines what is legal and illegal and invests that distinction with 
legitimacy. The state also has the power to enforce the law, using violence 
if necessary, at least in theory if not always in practice. Every state that joins 
the United Nations subscribes to these ideas. Yet in reality state officials are 
themselves also not infrequently implicated in illegality of various kinds. This 
simple observation, which certainly holds true for Indonesia, is the starting 
point for the explorations in this volume. 
Throughout Indonesia, as in many other countries of the world, the in-
volvement of state officials in illegal activity is both ubiquitous and a matter 
of public knowledge. At the upper level of the state are the major scandals 
that habitually excite public opinion when evidence comes to light of senior 
government officials stealing from the public purse, striking shady deals with 
private entrepreneurs, or fleecing money from them. Very often the logic of 
illegality in such cases is nakedly self-serving and predatory, summed up by 
the Supreme Court judge in Tim Lindsey and Simon Butt’s chapter in this 
4 See, for example, ‘KPK gadungan ditangkap’, Kompas 18-7-2006, ‘Polisi gadungan ditangkap karena 
diduga memeras’, Pikiran Rakyat 21-1-2010.
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volume whose questions to a supplicant’s lawyer are blunt: ‘Do you have 
money or not? If you don’t, I’ll make an offer to your adversary.’ As we move 
down, the same predatory dynamic underpins much official illegality, rang-
ing from the policemen who extort money or sexual favours from suspects if 
they want to be released without trial, through to the impecunious elemen-
tary school teacher who charges the parents of his or her pupils unofficial but 
obligatory fees. However, as the naked greed of the wealthy senior official 
gives way to the more modest demands of the lower civil servant, who levies 
fees only in order to maintain a humble lower middle-class lifestyle, social 
attitudes toward such behaviour often change, with the demands of the less 
senior official frequently viewed as reasonable and sometimes even regarded 
with sympathy. Moreover, as some of the contributions in this volume make 
clear, illegality by state officials often also serves useful functions for large 
groups of ordinary citizens, thus not only for those who are cut special deals 
at the expense of others (such as rival ligitants in court cases). As a result, 
such illegality is often viewed as entirely legitimate by large sectors of society. 
Consider, for example, the helpful immigration officials in the Riau Islands 
who sell migrants ‘real but fake’ travel documents cheaply so the latter can 
move on quickly to Malaysia or Singapore and who, as Michele Ford and 
Lenore Lyons explain in their chapter, are seen by local people as resisting an 
unjust and unworkable legal regime imposed on them by Jakarta. 
It is when we begin to consider the social approval that such illegal behav-
iour often evokes that the censorious and normatively charged tone that sur-
rounds much discussion of corruption, defined conventionally as the ‘misuse 
of public office for private gain’, begins to come under strain. This conventional 
understanding of corruption is also strained when we find examples of illegal-
ity that are ostensibly for ‘public’ purposes, such as a dramatic case in 1999 that 
involved some of Indonesia’s most senior military officers counterfeiting Rp 
19.2 billion (US$2 million) in Rp 50,000 notes in order to buy weapons for pro-
integration militia in East Timor. According to one of those charged in the case, 
this activity was carried out with the approval of officials at Bank Indonesia 
(BI), so long as ‘the amount printed did not exceed Rp 200 billion. The numbers 
and series were to be given by BI, the quality of the printing had to be good, 
and the fake notes were not to circulate outside East Timor.5 As both Ross 
McLeod and Howard Dick and Jeremy Mulholland make clear in their contri-
butions to this volume, state officials routinely violate their own cumbersome 
and opaque rules just to ensure the regular functioning of the bureaucracy. To 
further complicate matters, many state officials are also involved in ‘ordinary’ 
illegality that occurs in the societal domain and does not involve as its main 
focus the predation of state resources. Wherever one goes in Indonesia, state 
5 ‘Investigation: smiling – all the way to the bank’, Tempo 10-16 July 2001.
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officials are especially likely to be involved in criminal activities that involve 
a high degree of organization, such as extortion and protection rackets, smug-
gling, illegal logging, and the narcotics trade, while law enforcement officers 
enjoy close and murky relations with everyday criminals. 
Before we go further, a qualification is in order. We certainly do not believe 
that illegality is the exclusive preserve of state officials, nor that state officials 
never take action to uphold legal order. Much illegal activity in Indonesia is 
carried on entirely by individuals who are not directly connected with the 
state. Indonesia has its share of robbery by taxi drivers, enslavement of do-
mestic servants by wealthy entrepreneurs, tax dodging by restaurateurs and 
the full range of mendacity, cruelty, crimes of passion and of desperation 
that modern societies are capable of generating. Moreover, the state employs 
a large number of functionaries to police the rules it sets for society. We do 
not wish to create the impression that state officials never uphold these rules. 
Many police detectives, prosecutors, judges, jailers, as well as teachers, social 
workers, and other public moralists do in Indonesia more or less what they do 
in other countries to control this kind of behaviour. Indonesia is by no means a 
Hobbesian jungle. According to (somewhat problematic and dated) compara-
tive official statistics (Arthur and Marenin 1995), homicide, rape and robbery 
rates in Indonesia have historically been among the lowest in the world. But 
we have chosen not to focus primarily on these state successes in maintaining 
legal order. The reason is not that we dispute their reality. Rather it is that 
control of crime is so often overshadowed by other forms of illegal activity in 
which state functionaries collaborate or are even the directing agents.
Why, then, did we write this book? In the first place, phenomena that so 
constantly undermine public faith in the state cry out for morally engaged 
comment and analysis. The popular 1998 reformasi movement that brought 
down President Suharto’s New Order regime demanded above all an end 
to illegal practices by state officials, from military human rights abuses to 
nepotistic investment policies. This movement created as its main rallying 
cry the condemnation of Corruption, Collusion, Nepotism (Korupsi, Kolusi 
dan Nepotisme, KKN), a phrase that has remained central to public political 
discourse to this day. The problem of corruption, which in public perception 
seems to trump all other forms of illegality, has stimulated a flood of advice 
to every government since that of Suharto, both from within and outside the 
country. Yet today corruption and other illegal practices by state officials 
have proven more resistant to reform than people had hoped. Many new 
anti-corruption regulations have been created, new institutions built, elec-
tions have introduced a measure of accountability for parliamentarians and 
elected executives, and the much lauded Corruption Eradication Commission 
(Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK) has made spectacular arrests. Yet 
Indonesia has crept up only slowly on international corruption lists. It has 
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gone from 2.0 to 2.8 (on a scale of 0 to 10) between 1998 and 2009, according 
to Transparency International’s corruption perception index (admittedly an 
index that has been widely criticized for the methods that it uses).6 According 
to the World Bank, Indonesia had by 2008 improved to 31% on ‘control of 
corruption’ from an absolute low of 9% in the chaotic year of 1998, but it 
has still not quite returned to its late New Order level of 33% measured in 
1996.7 Public opinion surveys in Indonesia itself likewise record alarmingly 
low levels of trust in public institutions, and a common view that corruption 
is all-pervasive. Indonesia’s public political domain is still characterized by 
animated discussion of corruption and the abuse of power by public officials: 
this alone makes a scholarly treatment of this topic urgent and appropriate.
This ubiquity and resilience of corruption and other illegal practices by 
state officials points to a second reason why we wrote this book. As many re-
ports have put it, corruption and other forms of state illegality in Indonesia are 
‘entrenched’. We argue it is precisely this entrenched character that requires 
attention. Rather than add to the flood of advice with another survey of the list 
of things that should be, could be, or had already been done to combat illegal 
practices, we wanted to do some serious intellectual work on the problem of 
entrenched illegality. What is state illegality entrenched in and how does it be-
come entrenched? Answering this question involves first studying actual cases 
of state illegality, and trying to understand them, as far as possible, from the 
standpoint of the participants. In particular, as will become apparent through 
this volume, it especially requires studying closely the webs of relationships 
that run in all directions, both within and beyond the state. Within the state, 
for example, a senior teacher has to bribe his or her Education Department 
superior if he or she wants to be appointed school principal (as related in 
Danang Widoyoko’s chapter). The ‘backing’ (beking or deking) that petty gang-
sters enjoy from military patrons who help to enforce their protection rackets 
among Jakarta’s street vendors cross the formal boundary between state and 
society (see Ian Wilson in this book). Motorcycle thieves, pirates, drug dealers, 
prostitutes, illegal timber cutters, their clients and financiers, who sometimes 
appear to operate purely within society, are often protected by state actors. 
Comparative statistics throw little light on these relationships. Only detailed 
case studies of the kind included in this book can do that. 
A third goal of the volume, therefore, was to see what inquiring into the 
nature of illegal activities by state officials would tell us about the nature 
of the state itself. Much discussion of corruption and other forms of illegal 
behaviour by state officials takes a highly normative view of the state, see-
6
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ing them as deviations from an ideal bureaucratic machine bound by legal 
rationality. Even the words we use to describe this sort of behaviour betray 
these assumptions: misconduct, misuse, misdemeanours and so on. By look-
ing at both the broad patterns and micro processes of state illegality, we wish 
to describe and understand the state as it is, not as we believe it should be. 
Taking this approach does not entail abandoning the moral engagement that 
underpins our work, but is simply necessary for thinking clearly about the 
state and illegality. Clear thought is especially necessary in circumstances 
where, as we explain below, there is a large gap between activities that are 
formally in contravention of state law and hence illegal and those which are 
the target of social opprobrium and hence illicit. Our observations of actual 
practices led us to rethink some fundamental ideas about the nature of the 
state in Indonesia, especially regarding its socially embedded character.
In noting the ubiquity and entrenched character of corruption and state 
illegality, and its centrality to how the state operates, we are of course not 
breaking entirely new ground in the study of Indonesian politics and society 
but instead building on a long tradition of close observation of illegal prac-
tices built up during the New Order and before it. Studies by Harold Crouch 
(1979), Richard Robison (1986) and others on the centrality of corrupt patron-
age distribution to the functioning of the New Order have become classics 
in the field. In the late New Order years, a growing focus on the state’s links 
with criminal groups,8 and historical research on the anti-communist po-
groms of 1965-1966 (Cribb 1990) opened researchers’ eyes to the illegal vio-
lence the state perpetrated. To mention just one other example, in a striking 
essay written in the aftermath of the collapse of Suharto’s New Order regime, 
Tim Lindsey (2001:284) wrote of the New Order as a ‘criminal state‘ in which 
‘the real structures and systems by which the New Order operated were il-
legal‘. We have learned much from these and other prior research efforts, 
and present this volume as a contribution to an ongoing discussion about the 
nature of the state and illegality in Indonesia.
Studies of state actors’ entanglement in illegality in Indonesia, and beyond, 
can be conveniently divided into four broad streams: marketist, culturalist, 
statist and strategic-relational approaches. The first category is the dominant 
one in writing on corruption, and has surprisingly little to say about the state 
except as the field in which corruption takes place; the final three are dis-
tinct approaches to the study of the state that imply different emphases and 
postures regarding the study of illegality by state functionaries. While the 
boundaries between the approaches are somewhat fuzzy, each has a distinct 
view on how to explain the sources and motivations of the intermeshing of 
state and illegality in countries like Indonesia. 
8 Especially in the so-called ‘Petrus‘, or ‘mysterious shooting’, killings of 1983 (Bourchier 1990, Siegel 1998).
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The first interpretation, which is dominant in the international scholarly 
literature on corruption, posits that state officials operate according to a mar-
ket logic. Illegality by state officials – like all forms of crime – is a consequence 
of rational choice, in which participants balance the likely benefits of crime 
against the risk of being apprehended. Individual officials act like rational 
entrepreneurs seeking to maximize their ‘rents’. There is nothing inherently 
problematic with the state in this view, except that it is sometimes too weak 
to enforce its rules on all its members all the time. The Africanist Colin Leys 
(1965) wrote a pioneering paper articulating this viewpoint. He urged the 
study of corruption not primarily as a moral problem but as one involving 
material incentives for officials operating in an impoverished and poorly 
disciplined state. The political scientist James Scott was another pioneer of 
this approach with his observation that corruption was a businesslike affair 
(Scott 1969) (although Scott also emphasized the nature of the regime that dis-
pensed corrupt patronage and thus foreshadowed the statist interpretation). 
On the assumption that people act collectively only if it brings them a private 
return (Olson 1971), neo-liberal economists subsequently developed a theory 
of rent-seeking behaviour that remains influential. In this view, officials enjoy 
discretion in the way they collect or spend the large sums of state money that 
pass through their hands. If their salaries are low, if they are under pressure 
from all sides to do more than they can realistically achieve, or if hardly any-
one looks over their shoulder while they work, so the argument goes, they 
are likely to collude with the taxpayers or recipients of government funds 
to cream off some of those funds on the way. Governments that implement 
regulations, for example, to restrict imports or license businesses, merely 
create opportunities for corruption that, on balance, cost society more than 
having no regulation at all (Krueger 1974). The implications were not only 
that corruption was more costly to society than previously thought, but also 
that the way to solve the problem was to reduce government intervention in 
the market, thus reducing the opportunities for state officials to act corruptly. 
The economist James M. Buchanan won the 1986 Nobel prize for developing 
these fundamentally anti-state ideas into a field of study known as public 
policy (Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock 1980). The approach long remained 
agenda-setting in anti-corruption prescriptions produced by multilateral 
agencies like the World Bank. By the late 1990s, however, the emphasis was 
shifting from pushing back government intervention, regulation and discre-
tion to improving government discipline (Rose-Ackerman 1999). The World 
Bank, USAID, the United Nations Development Program and other interna-
tional agencies have produced numerous expert ‘good governance’ reports 
over the last decade advising the Indonesian government how to reform 
its institutions to improve free market competition, reduce government red 
tape, protection and subsidies, and strengthen checks and balances. Most of 
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Indonesia’s governance reforms since the International Monetary Fund inter-
vention in 1997 have been technically informed by this advice. Yet the mar-
ketist approach has been criticized by many authors, including some in this 
book (see in particular the chapter by John McCarthy) on a range of grounds. 
One criticism has been that by locating the motive for corruption and other 
forms of state illegality in individual greed it misses wider contexts. For ex-
ample it closes its eyes to the very embeddedness of such practices in state 
institutions, the often political motivations that guide such behaviour, and 
the social and cultural codes that govern and legitimate it.
The second approach, which we call culturalist, imagines that illegality 
by state officials is rooted not in rational calculation but in a moral order that 
legitimates certain forms of behaviour by officials even when they contravene 
the state’s formal laws. Individuals act not primarily according to calcula-
tions of potential personal benefit balanced against the risk of exposure and 
punishment, but according to a coherent set of moral values. Very often, the 
roots of such a moral order are depicted as lying in the precolonial past. The 
Africanist J.P. Olivier de Sardan (1999) has explained contemporary corrup-
tion with the logic of a ‘moral economy of corruption’, in which tribal chiefs 
expect tribute, private and public affairs are indistinguishable, and ordinary 
folk are not citizens with rights but subjects who must ingratiate themselves 
with the chief to get anything done. Illegality disappears from this literature 
as an inappropriate alien imposition. At most, it persists as a theatrical device 
in discourses aiming to discredit rivals; but everyone understands that such 
talk is hypocritical. Africanists find the culturalist argument so compelling 
because the modern state south of the Sahara is often so weak that it re-
sembles a thin institutional veneer over a society whose roots lie far deeper 
(D.J. Smith 2006). In Indonesia the state is far less dysfunctional than in, say, 
Sierra Leone, yet here too it is much more thinly spread than in a developed 
economy. This is evident from statistics of, for example, civil servants as a 
proportion of the population, or the state budget as a proportion of GDP.9
Scholars studying weak states and resurgent authoritarianism in Southeast 
Asia in the 1960s and 1970s began to describe elite behaviour in terms of a 
return to a precolonial template. Several took an interest in the role of pa-
tronage in providing internal coherence to these states, in the power of the 
patrimonial values behind authoritarian and corrupt bureaucratic practices, 
and in the precolonial origins of both the values and the practices (Resink 
1975; T.M. Smith 1971; Wertheim 1964). Indeed, the Austrian ethnologist 
Robert Heine-Geldern had helped found modern Southeast Asian studies in 
the United States with a 1942 paper on Southeast Asian notions of kingship 
9 Indonesia’s central government tax revenue was 12.8% of GDP in 2001, less than a third of the 38.2% in the 
Netherlands, while 2.0% of the total population worked for the Indonesian government in 1997, less than half 
the 4.6% in the Netherlands in 1995 (Tables 1 and A.4 in UNPAN 2002).
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(Heine-Geldern 1956). This led Benedict Anderson to write his influential 
paper on the resurgent influence of allegedly traditional Javanese values of 
deference on contemporary Indonesian politics, in which he ascribed official 
corruption to ‘the residual influences of the appanage system [of precolonial 
times] in contemporary administrative behavior’ (Anderson 1972:48). Harold 
Crouch, in his analyses of New Order military politics, likewise drew on the 
idea that precolonial styles of personal rulership had experienced a revival 
in the postcolonial state. Sharing insights common in Africanist and Asianist 
circles, he saw the bureaucracy as a highly personalized hierarchy of neo-
patrimonial relations, in which ‘traditional modes of thought and behavior 
have often continued to influence the workings of apparently modern insti-
tutions’ (H. Crouch 1979:194). The idea of a ‘culture of corruption’ rooted in 
Java’s feudal traditions remains strong in journalistic circles (Loveard 1999), 
and above all in Indonesian public discourse. For example, some years ago, 
the Indonesian historian Djoko Suryo wrote:
Under the Javanese kings the word corruption did not exist. But that doesn’t 
mean behaviour similar to corruption did not exist. Tribute beyond taxation 
was one example. That was normal at the time […] Probably the regents of 
those days only realized this was wrong after Multatuli in [the novel] Max 
Havelaar harshly criticized their tribute practices.10
During the late 1970s and 1980s serious doubts began to arise among schol-
ars of Indonesia about such an approach, under the impact of both Marxist-
oriented structuralism (see especially Robison 1981) and Edward Said’s 
powerful critique of Orientalist scholarship, much of which, in Said’s view, 
presented an ahistorical and essentialized understanding of the East and 
its culture. For Indonesianists these doubts were expressed in an important 
book by John Pemberton (1994), which showed that Javanese political cul-
ture had not remained static since precolonial times. On the contrary, it was 
largely constructed out of the interaction between the Javanese courts and 
the growing Dutch state during the nineteenth century. The manipulation of 
‘culture’ continued during the New Order, when the regime invoked themes 
of Javanese subservience to enforce its authoritarian rule. Pemberton did 
not intend by this observation to replace the power of culture with that of 
the state, but rather to contextualize it. Thus, while culturalist explanations 
for involvement by state officials in illegal behaviour can often be revealing, 
they need to avoid reifying culture as static and somehow isolated from the 
behaviours they seek to explain. Rather, the cultural codes governing illegal-
ity are best seen as themselves embedded in and constructed out of dynamic 
10 ‘Pamomong: budaya ‘korupsi’ di Jawa (1)’, Suara Merdeka 14-8-1997.
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interactions between state and societal actors.
The preceding two interpretations of the state’s entanglement in illegality 
– the one marketist, the other culturalist – tend to think of the modern state as 
largely unable to discipline its members. The first sees state actors as primarily 
acting out of their own material interests, and the second sees them as mainly 
motivated by a complex of cultural obligations. A third interpretation, some-
times called the statist approach, attributes a great deal of autonomy to the 
state as a unit. Rather than seeing it as being too weak to prevent illegality, or 
as confounded by competing moral values, it views the state itself as a preda-
tory institution designed to extract benefits for the people who control it.11 
The dominant image of the state in the study of Indonesian and Southeast 
Asian politics and history is of an alien and sovereign force imposing its 
will upon society. The injurious effects of a relatively autonomous colonial 
bureaucratic machine upon an agrarian society became a major theme in 
Southeast Asian studies, notably at Cornell University under the influence of 
Oliver Wolters and Benedict Anderson. The model was attractive for many 
observers for a long time because colonial and independent states that lacked 
legitimacy and acted violently formed a pattern throughout the region in 
much of the twentieth century. Anderson took this approach to its apogee in 
an influential essay that posited something resembling a zero-sum contest be-
tween state and society in Indonesia. He described the New Order regime as 
representing little less than the victory of state over nation (Anderson 1983). 
This approach, which tends to see the state as a leviathan, undifferentiated 
and monolithic, gave rise to many revelatory studies of Indonesian politics. 
It especially helped explain instances of gross violence perpetrated by state 
officials against citizens (Anderson 2001). But this approach is arguably less 
useful for explaining the quotidian practices of everyday corruption and 
petty illegality with which this book is mostly concerned. Borrowing from 
Robert Cribb, we might also argue that this approach has little to say about 
the motivations behind state illegality, except to point to ‘personal lust for 
extraordinary power – and a drive to maintain that power’.12 
A fourth approach to the study of the state that has been gaining ground 
in recent years has sometimes been called ‘strategic-relational’.13 In this ap-
proach, illegal behaviour by state officials is best understood as a product 
of competitive strategizing among the heterogeneity of interests and actors 
that populates the state. While wanting to retain a central place for the state 
11 We are grateful to Robert Cribb for this formulation.
12 Cribb 2009:2. Cribb made this comment in relation to early studies showing participation by Western states 
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insights conferred by such research had in meshing with conventional political science analysis.
13 Jessop 2007. An alternative nomenclature would be derived from what Migdal (2001) calls a ‘state-in-
society’ approach. 
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in their analysis even in developing countries, the scholars who formulated 
the strategic-relational approach have preferred to see the state less as an 
autonomous actor and more as an arena that favours certain kinds of strate-
gic action while obstructing others, and where multiple players compete for 
influence, make alliances, and expropriate resources. One of the most influen-
tial authors in this field, Joel Migdal (2001:15-6), defines the state as ‘a field of 
power marked by the use and threat of violence and shaped by (1) the image 
of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the 
people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts’. 
Viewing the state as ‘field of power’ is central to this emerging revisionist po-
litical science literature. Abandoning the conventional Weberian ideal type of 
the autonomous, bureaucratic state ‘firing on all cylinders’ (as Migdal 2001:14 
put it), it proposes simply studying actual state practices with the eye of the 
ethnographer, minus the Weberian assumptions. It no longer sees the state 
as a ‘thing‘, but as a relational arena. In this view, the essence of the state is 
relationships and strategies, developing through time and space, rather than 
static structures or impersonal rules.14 The basic argument is to envision the 
state as a competitive arena and site of strategic struggle for the ultimate rule-
making authority. The ‘ideal’ state, meanwhile, should be studied for what it 
is, namely an ideological construct or, in Migdal’s term, an image, deployed 
by both state officials and their opponents in society. Another thrust of this 
thinking is that the homogeneity of the state, and its autonomy from social 
forces – themes prominent in writing about Indonesia during the New Order 
– have been greatly exaggerated. Instead, the study of the state is increasingly 
being reinserted into the study of society, and anthropologists, political sci-
entists and others are becoming more alert to the ways in which state actors 
seek out and collaborate with societal allies, often to such an extent that the 
boundary dividing state from society may be blurred almost to the point of 
erasure, especially at the local level. 
A strategic-relational approach helps illuminate the problem of illegality 
and the state in several ways. It can throw light on the ways in which the 
socially embedded character of the state shapes and impels certain forms of 
illegality. An example may be drawn from Gerben Nooteboom’s study in 
this book of the relationships between police officers and Madurese migrant 
entrepreneurs, including ones engaged in illegal activity, in East Kalimantan. 
14 The theoretical political science literature on the state is too voluminous to trace here. One of us (Van 
Klinken) co-authored two introductory chapters tracing its links with writings about the state in Indonesia from 
the 1950s to the 2000s (both in Van Klinken and Barker 2009). A powerful statement rejecting the concreteness 
of the state and calling for an ethnographic study of actual state practices in all their fragmentedness is Abrams 
(1988). Van Klinken owes a debt to Bob Jessop’s ‘strategic-relational’ approach to the study of the state (Jessop 
^__!
+**>
]+\+X>*
&"
X+'Q"
&
#>\><&"Z\+
*"&"+|+'"
~=
Z<>*
>[X&'&*
"&"
"+
*"&"+
Z*
&
*><Z&X
#+X&"Z>'

by which he meant that we cannot study the state without having a clear grasp of what we mean by society. 
12 The state and illegality in Indonesia 
Here we see a complex web of relationships in which state actors not only 
threaten and exploit, but also depend upon, societal actors. As Nooteboom 
writes ‘The police in Samarinda need to permit a certain level of criminality in 
order to keep criminality under control.’ Police officers who collaborate with 
petty criminals while tolerating and profiting from certain forms of illegal be-
haviour can gain access to criminal networks. They need access to obtain the 
information, resources and agents they need to act against other forms of ille-
gality they consider more serious. Here engagement by state actors in illegal-
ity is not so much a sign of venality or of the overbearing power of the state 
over society as it is of the state’s dependence on societal actors. Seeing the 
state as an arena in which competing forces contend for power and resources 
also provides a political motive for state actors to engage in activity that can 
be illegal according to the state’s normative rules. An example is drawn from 
Marcus Mietzner’s chapter on illegal funding practices by political parties. 
We cannot understand this behaviour simply through a marketist lens, for 
there must be easier and less risky ways of making quick money than run-
ning a public election campaign. Nor will cultural deference to patrons do as 
an explanation, for frequently the relationships are quite businesslike. And, 
of course, by disaggregating the state into smaller units that often compete 
against each other, the strategic-relational approach avoids the statist trap of 
assuming the state is a single ‘leviathan’. 
The authors of this book debated these fundamental issues about the state 
and illegality at two workshops. We did not seek to reach a common view, 
but some commonalities did emerge. One of these is a certain theoretical 
ecumenism. Most of us feel the pull of all four approaches discussed above, 
and we believe all have made durable contributions to our understanding of 
the problem of the state and illegality. We are not necessarily trying to burst 
any paradigms, or to create new ones. There is, as we have indicated, a rich 
tradition of studying the state and illegality in Indonesia, even if it does not 
always use the same terminology and nomenclature that we use here. We 
want to contribute to this growing tradition. Before we explain how we hope 
to do so in conceptual terms, it is necessary to explore the methods contribu-
tors to this book used in their research.
Methodological challenges
Illegality is notoriously difficult to study directly. In most situations, illegal ac-
tivities are either fully or partly hidden. Individuals involved in illegal behav-
iour typically have strong interests in concealing that involvement, because 
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they fear legal sanction, social opprobrium or both.15 Their individual interests 
in concealment are typically reinforced by strong collective codes of silence 
in institutions and networks involved in the illegal behaviour, codes that can 
be policed socially, by exclusion from the benefits of illegality or by physical 
violence. Even where participants know that certain forms of behaviour (petty 
corruption, for example) are highly unlikely to invite juridical punishment, 
even a small risk is typically enough to discourage them from breaking their 
habit of silence to discuss their involvement openly with non-participants. 
Where the illegal activity in question, such as logging in state forests or unof-
ficial border crossing, is locally socially acceptable or legitimate, and takes 
place more or less in the public eye, participants can be more willing to talk. 
But even then they are likely to fear that open acknowledgment to a researcher 
or journalist might invite the unwelcome attention of outside law enforcement 
officials. Moreover, illegal behaviours are often conducted in a highly coded 
language that can be next to impossible for non-initiates to penetrate.
In general, secretiveness increases in tandem with both the illicitness and 
illegality of the behaviour in question, and with the risk and magnitude of 
punishment. It is easier to research petty corruption than grand corruption, 
and easier to research, say, the smuggling of contraband where it is everyday 
and visible (for example, ordinary trade goods on the Thai-Burma border) than 
where it is highly secretive (for example, the smuggling of narcotics through 
major airports). Finally, and of particular concern for this book, illegality in-
volving state officials is almost by definition difficult to research because, as 
already indicated, modern bureaucratic states are based on the principle, or at 
least the fiction, that they are rule-bound and disciplined organizations. Hence, 
no matter how ubiquitously state officials engage in corrupt and other illegal 
practices, they are typically unwilling to acknowledge them publicly. 
As a result of this combination of circumstances, directly researching il-
legality can be both difficult and risky for researchers and those who help 
them. Investigative journalists and other researchers who have looked into 
organized crime in some countries have been killed; some Indonesian jour-
nalists who have dug too deeply into corruption cases have suffered the same 
fate. Many others have been subject to non-fatal forms of violence, or threats 
of it. The more common problem is that of information failure: the frustrating 
experience of coming up against a blank wall, of knowing that a particular 
form of illegal behaviour is everywhere around you, but learning that nobody 
will even acknowledge its existence in anything but the most platitudinous 
terms. Little wonder, therefore, that so much literature on illegality ends up 
relying on data produced by law enforcement agencies or on anonymous 
15 For interesting comparative discussions of the practical, ethical and methodological challenges of 
researching criminality, see Ferrell and Hamm (1998).
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surveys and other forms of arms-length research.
How did the contributors to this volume try to get around these problems? 
What kinds of methods did we use and what lessons might be drawn from our 
approaches to benefit scholars studying similar phenomena in different coun-
tries and contexts? Answers to these questions begin with three observations. 
The first observation is that many of the contributors to this volume did 
not become interested in the topic of illegality by design. Instead, many of us 
were drawn into it as a by-product of other research on a highly diverse range 
of subject matters ranging from party system institutionalization to migrant 
risk-taking cultures, from armed insurgency to local politics. That so many of 
us ended up becoming concerned with illegality is itself indicative of the cen-
trality of this phenomenon, especially corruption, in Indonesia’s economic, 
social and political structures. 
But this background also had implications for the methods that many of 
us used in researching illegality. In most of the cases in this book where the 
interest in illegality arose as part of a wider research agenda, researchers 
were able to use the local or sectoral knowledge, expertise and contacts they 
had built up over long periods to gradually learn more about illegality. Some 
contributors had spent long periods getting to know informants from par-
ticular locations and/or sectors: Madurese brick makers in East Kalimantan 
(Nooteboom), former guerilla fighters in Aceh (Aspinall), political party lead-
ers in Jakarta (Mietzner), senior officials in state security bodies (Honna) and 
so on. We were, in other words, able to draw on relations of familiarity and 
trust built up over long periods of fieldwork – sometimes totaling years – to 
slowly learn more about the illegal behaviours that are the subject of this 
book. If expressed schematically, we might say that our research typically 
progressed through phases: first, becoming generally familiar with a topic 
area, research site and set of actors; next, learning about the ‘public transcript’ 
(Scott 1985) of legally sanctioned activity concerning that topic; then, gradu-
ally picking up second-hand stories and rumours about the shadow world of 
corruption and illegality; and, finally, being able to discuss under-the-table 
details of such illegal behaviours directly with participants.
In one respect, therefore, this book is founded on what is typically called 
an area studies approach. Contributors to the book include persons trained in 
various disciplines (anthropology, economics, political science, sociology and 
history), but those of us from outside Indonesia have all spent long periods 
of training on the language, history, culture and politics of the country, and 
have spent years acquiring the research skills needed to conduct fieldwork 
there. The techniques most of the contributors used to research their chap-
ters will be familiar to area specialist scholars with a variety of disciplinary 
backgrounds: long immersion in field sites, participant observation, semi-
structured interviews, intensive utilization of local press reports, and so on. 
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As one of our contributors, Howard Dick, put it, our research often involved 
asking the basic question of all fieldwork: ‘What do people do and why do 
they do it?’ Curiosity about the social, economic and political interactions we 
witnessed around us prompted us to inquire into illegal practices, but doing 
so would have been impossible without knowledge of local culture, politics 
and language. Such knowledge was essential for at least beginning to under-
stand the often subtle signals associated with illegal behaviour and to begin 
to penetrate the largely hidden world of illegality.
In some respects, therefore, this book may be read as a defence of area 
studies approaches, or at least as a demonstration of what theoretically in-
formed area studies scholarship can produce. Indeed, we suspect that the 
skills that area studies training provides are essential for collecting data on, 
understanding, and theorizing about the sorts of behaviours discussed in 
this book. This comment applies not only to Indonesia: the inter-penetration 
of state and illegality discussed in this book is not just an Indonesian phe-
nomenon but is strikingly similar to patterns described by scholars working 
in diverse settings in Africa, Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet states, and in parts of the developed world. The ‘shadow state’ 
is close to being a universal phenomenon, at least in the developing world 
(Wilson and Lindsey 2009). New understandings of the state that take into 
account this reality are almost exclusively products of area studies scholar-
ship. Without the insights that grew from applying our area studies skills, we 
would still be constrained by highly stylized and abstract notions of the state 
that bear little resemblance to the state’s actual workings.
A second observation is that, for most of us, conducting fieldwork re-
search on illegal practices also meant adopting a considered approach to our 
informants, whereby we guaranteed their anonymity and safety and avoided 
judging them personally for participating in the activities we set out to 
study. Scholars who have researched similar topics in other places have been 
required to adopt a similar posture. Giorgio Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 
(2006:9), for example, in the introduction to their study on the everyday poli-
tics of corruption in Africa note that ‘it was important that, as researchers, we 
refrained as far as possible from all moral condemnation and normative judg-
ment throughout the duration of the study‘. This posture derives from practi-
cal considerations flowing from the imperative that, if we are to understand 
it, corruption and state illegality ‘has to be studied from the viewpoint of the 
participants’ (Olivier de Sardan 1999:25). Research on illegality most often 
fails because informants seek to maintain secrecy. Both in order to overcome 
this challenge and for ethical reasons we were required to ensure confidenti-
ality of sources to ensure that none of our informants or the persons close to 
them were harmed directly or indirectly because they assisted our research. 
This could at times lead to uncomfortable situations for the researcher. By not 
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stating disapproval of illegal acts, the informant might assume the researcher 
approves of them or might even wish to participate. Thus, one of our number 
(Ian Wilson) was once unexpectedly asked to address a group of about 200 
petty gangsters, with police in attendance, to explain why he thought the 
group was within its rights to demand ‘taxes’ from businesses. Those present 
assumed that he would be a public advocate on their behalf.16 
A third observation about the contributions in this volume is that many 
of their authors were informed by or made use of what some readers may 
consider to be a surprisingly large array of material available from public 
sources, especially from the Indonesian media. Especially since the fall of the 
Suharto government in 1998 (but even before that), the media have been full 
of reports about corruption and other impropriety by state officials. Indeed, 
we might say that exposing corruption has become the major concern of es-
pecially the quality print press over the last decade. The pervasiveness of this 
sort of reporting is itself a product of two contradictory features of illegality 
(especially corruption) in contemporary Indonesia that have already been re-
marked upon: its ubiquity, pervasiveness and centrality in virtually all forms 
of state activity on the one hand, and the social illegitimacy of much of it on 
the other. This combination of circumstances means, for one thing, that there 
has been an enormous volume of public reporting on corruption and other 
illegal behaviour by state officials, even if relatively little of this reporting is 
deeply investigative, and if there remain many silences and inconsistencies 
in it. The silences are due in part to what is commonly called the ‘envelope 
culture’ in the media itself – so named for the most common method for 
conveying cash payments to journalists. Yet the envelope culture has not si-
lenced some extremely revealing public reports about corruption. The story 
of involvement by state intelligence officers in mass-scale counterfeiting near 
the start of this introduction is one of them. Highly detailed stories abound 
about bribes and commissions paid by aspiring politicians in the regions to 
legislators or party officials whom they believed would further their ambi-
tions. Almost all the contributors to this book have learned a great deal about 
their topics from the Indonesian media and we should acknowledge our debt. 
Even with the combination of sources, skills and methods elaborated upon 
above, the contributors to this volume still faced a set of challenges that we 
suspect are common to researchers on the state and illegality anywhere in the 
world. These challenges can constrain the approaches that researchers take to 
their topics and limit the information they acquire. Some of these limitations 
are evident in this book, perhaps not so much in what it does contain as in 
what it does not touch upon. 
A first limitation concerns sources. It remains very difficult to conduct 
16 Our thanks to Ian Wilson for sharing this experience with us.
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research on illegality and the state by obtaining information directly from 
state officials involved in illegality. Most of the scholars in this book ap-
proached their topics from the margins. There were exceptions, but our 
overall tendency was not to seek or obtain information from state officials 
involved in illegal activities, but from people who had dealings with them. 
We spoke with Madurese migrants struggling to establish themselves eco-
nomically, rather than with the police officers who levy fees on them; with 
ex-combatants trying to make it in the contracting industry, rather than the 
government officials they bribe and intimidate; with petty gangsters rather 
than the police officers with whom they cooperate, and so on. Sometimes we 
were able to cross-check information from other sources, such as the press 
and NGO reports. Most respondents naturally show a bias determined by 
their position in the system of relations in a particular illegal activity, so the 
ongoing problem is how we can obtain a full picture. Where illegal behav-
iours are locally legitimate and carried on more or less in full public view, it 
can be less difficult to access state officials. Thus Michele Ford and Lenore 
Lyons had greater success in speaking directly with state officials engaged in 
irregular border crossing in the Riau Islands than did most of the researchers 
who contributed to this book. By contrast, Ian Wilson chose, for his research 
on relations between gangsters and police in Jakarta, to interview retired po-
lice officers rather than active ones. This technique has also been long used 
by researchers working on the Indonesian military.
Our preferences are part of a broader pattern. With only a few exceptions, 
scholars have not been able to observe closely the everyday operations of 
state officials in such a way as to attain direct insights about their involve-
ment in formally illegal activities. (One notable exception is Joshua Barker, 
who wrote a PhD dissertation on the police and local security in West Java: 
Barker 1999a). This is not only because state officials tend to be reticent about 
such activities, but also because of a wider culture of secrecy in the bureau-
cracy that makes it difficult to obtain official permission to conduct such 
research. One participant in the workshop that led up to this volume, but 
who did not end up contributing a chapter, had achieved the rare feat for a 
foreign researcher of building close research relationships with police officers 
in one Indonesian town. He observed that he did not want to make inquiries 
of them or other informants about police involvement in corruption because 
he believed that such inquiries would jeopardize his relationships and lead to 
them cutting off all contact. Another participant (Gerben Nooteboom), whose 
field research touched directly upon illegal activity by police officers, did not 
attempt to even make contact with those officers, fearing this would attract 
unwelcome attention. Many other participants agreed that they deliberately 
minimized their direct contacts with state officials – especially those from law 
enforcement and security agencies – because they feared that if their research 
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interests became known the authorities could take action to interrupt or stop 
their research, or even have them expelled from the country. As a result of 
such practical difficulties, in Indonesia as elsewhere, we still have a long way 
to go in understanding what might be called the internal modalities of state 
officials’ involvement in illegal activities, especially the norms and moral 
codes governing that involvement. 
A second limitation concerns the range of topics we address in the book. 
Certain types of activity remain very difficult to research and are hardly 
touched upon in this book. One contributor, Ian Wilson, remarked that while 
he found it possible to observe the daily activities of small-scale gangsters 
running local protection rackets in Jakarta, as soon as his inquiries began to 
touch upon the activities of much more secretive, violent and wealthy gangs 
known to be involved in more highly organized criminal activities such as 
the narcotics trade, he was immediately warned off in a threatening manner. 
Petty gangsters themselves also warned him he would end up ‘out of his 
depth’. In his research on contracting activity in post-conflict Aceh, Edward 
Aspinall found it much easier to obtain information about the activities of 
relatively poor, low-ranking and unsuccessful ex-combatants than about 
how their leaders were managing to strike deals with senior government 
officials. As a result of such difficulties, where high-scale elite corruption or 
illegality in Indonesia is discussed publicly, the discussion tends to be either 
highly charged and condemnatory (in the media or advocacy literature) or, 
in the scholarly literature, rather formal and abstract. Where flesh is put on 
the bones of such analyses, it is common to rely on a relatively small number 
of cases that have been exposed by the media or anti-corruption NGOs, or 
which have been prosecuted. As a result, while we have a relatively clear 
picture of the ubiquity of corruption in the upper echelons of the state, we 
often get little more than glimpses of its fine mechanics there or how it is 
comprehended by the participants. When close studies are made of the lived 
experiences of corruption and state involvement in illegality (and this book 
is one of the first concerted efforts to do this for Indonesia), the tendency 
is to focus on the petty rather than the grand, the everyday rather than the 
spectacular, the local rather than the national. Thus, this book contains dis-
cussions of small-scale street gangsters, but nothing on high-level organized 
crime; we have a chapter about the important topic of massive illegal border 
crossing by people, but not about the smuggling of narcotics; we learn about 
how low-ranking police officers interact with impoverished migrants in 
Kalimantan, but not how their most senior leaders exchange fees and favours 
with politicians in Jakarta.
All of this leads to an obvious point: we hope that this book will be a spur 
for future research efforts to comprehend more fully the relationship of state 
and illegality in Indonesia. We believe that we have only begun to scratch the 
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surface of many of the most intriguing and perplexing questions in the field. 
Key among them are those regarding the way state involvement in illegality 
is understood and legitimated by participants, how it is regulated by them, 
what systems of norms govern it, and how participants themselves draw the 
line between tolerated and excessive illegality. 
The approach of this book
Most of the authors gathered in this volume are university academics (one is 
a member of an important Indonesian anti-corruption organization). None 
are directly engaged in making policy or advising government. This gives us 
less access to the inner workings of government, but arguably a sharper eye 
for the unexpected twists and ironies that policy inevitably brings about. The 
academics all consider themselves social scientists – historians, anthropolo-
gists, political scientists, and economists – and at the same time area special-
ists. No doubt with some of the conceit that comes from enjoying what we 
do, we feel we have something to contribute that the well-funded multilateral 
agencies are missing. 
The following pages sets out what we consider to be the main messages 
of this book. The starting point for our project was our agreement that illegal 
activities by state officials are best understood, not as an aberration external 
to the normal workings of the state, but as somehow part of its very logic. 
Others had explored this line of reasoning before us (Heyman 1999), but 
not for Indonesia. It implied a research agenda of looking for contexts and 
processes that cut across the state-society divide. Doing that led us to fresh 
insights, and thence to the thematic chapter division. 
The book begins with a set of essays which contextualize the problem of 
illegality and the state historically and theoretically. Robert Cribb begins by 
arguing that a central problem in Indonesia is not that law does not matter, 
but that there is an elaborate ‘system of exemptions’ that means it does not 
apply to many persons, especially state officials. ‘Indonesia is not a lawless 
society, but rather one in which law is unevenly implemented’, he writes. 
Understanding this system, he argues, requires paying attention to three fac-
tors – state weakness, the disjuncture between law and popular moral values, 
and the fragility of a tradition of social contract. Each of these he traces back 
to the colonial era and the early decades of Indonesian independence when 
state criminality was necessary to ensure the state’s survival. Next, we have an 
analysis that contextualizes the current period of pervasive state corruption by 
looking back to the three decades of President Suharto’s New Order regime 
(1966-1998). In this period, argues Ross H. McLeod, Suharto constructed a 
‘franchise system […] the fundamental purpose of which was to use the coer-
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cive power of government privately to tax the general public and redistribute 
the revenue to a small elite’. The ‘franchisees’ in the system – virtually all state 
officials – were allowed to exploit the economic opportunities their positions 
brought for their own benefit, but they also had to make payments to the ‘fran-
chisor’ to secure their positions in the system. A key to the system’s resilience 
was the low formal remuneration paid to civil servants, making them perma-
nently dependent on the system of private taxation in which they participated, 
and in a state of permanent political dependence on their superiors and, ulti-
mately, Suharto himself. Howard Dick and Jeremy Mulholland, viewing the 
state as a ‘political marketplace’ draw particular attention to the use of slush 
funds to buy the loyalty of associates, rivals and subordinates within the state. 
Analysing the chief varieties of such slush funds, they trace the transition from 
a system under Suharto in which their use was arranged in a hierarchical pat-
tern, to a much more fluid and complex Reformasi pattern of horizontal intra-
elite rivalry and competitive party politics. In both periods slush funds play a 
key role in achieving an ‘elite consensus that moderates intra-elite rivalry and 
the social divisions that would flow from it’.
The second section of the book consists of a set of closely observed case 
studies on state illegality in various sectors of Indonesian government. Each 
one of these studies also raises broader conceptual and analytical issues about 
the relations between state and illegality. The first two essays in this section 
both illustrate how local regimes of legality/illegality can come into conflict 
with those imposed from the centre. The first essay, by John F. McCarthy, 
looks at the vexed topic of ‘illegal logging’ in Indonesia. He points to a ‘mis-
match between legal logic and everyday practices’ in the management of 
Indonesia’s natural resources. He does this by describing instances in which 
local people exploit the forest ‘more in keeping with local perceptions of jus-
tice than the formal law’, and instances when, following Indonesia’s demo-
cratic and decentralizing reforms from the late 1990s, local administrations 
authorized forestry activities that technically violated existing state laws. 
Michele Ford and Lenore Lyons illustrate the extent and pervasiveness of the 
phenomenon of local state illegality as they explore a sprawling but efficient 
web of migration agents and public servants in the Riau Islands. They coop-
erate to assist would-be ‘illegal’ migrants to obtain ‘real but fake’ documents 
that help them to cross the international border to Singapore and Malaysia to 
find employment. This system of illegality is understood by its participants 
not as something exploitative or oppressive, but as a helpful response to lo-
cal needs as well as the needs of migrants, in the face of an alien and unjust 
migration regime imposed on them by the national government in Jakarta. 
If Ford and Lyons describe state illegality from the perspective of some of 
the most marginalized and disempowered people in regional Indonesia – 
undocumented labour migrants – Marcus Mietzner, by contrast, looks at the 
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apex of political power in the regions. He details how aspirants for state office 
at the local level – candidates in direct elections for local government heads 
– systematically and flagrantly disregard the legal regime governing cam-
paign finances. They raise money from private donors, to whom they remain 
indebted after winning office. Gerry van Klinken and Edward Aspinall take 
up the same theme of the intermeshing of local economic and state power by 
examining the construction sector, which in Indonesia is the source of income 
for a hugely politically influential class – contractors – who are dependent 
upon state largesse for their success. In the Suharto era, relations between 
state actors and contractors were organized through formal corporatist orga-
nizations. Since democratization, contractors have remained tightly bound to 
the state, but now through complex and informal webs of influence and ex-
change. The pervasive system of corruption that results has proven resistant 
to attempts to reform construction and clean up government procurement. J. 
Danang Widoyoko explores corruption in the education sector. His analysis 
identifies four levels of corruption, from the Ministry of National Education 
and the national parliament in Jakarta, down to the principals and teachers 
at the school level. As with the preceding two chapters, Widoyoko also illus-
trates the intrinsically political nature of corruption. Everyone, from officials 
at the Ministry of National Education in the centre down to school principals 
in the villages, needs extra money. Whether they gain it from the national 
budget or from fees they illegally levy on students, they use it partly to buy 
political support and pay off superiors and potential adversaries. The recipi-
ents range from obstreperous legislators able to sabotage Ministry policy at 
the centre, to local bureaucrats able to transfer principals to remote and poor 
schools. In the last piece in this section, Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey provide 
a detailed exploration of illegality in the judicial system. Given the central 
role of the judiciary in upholding legality, this is clearly a crucial case study. 
Yet the judiciary is itself deeply implicated in illegality in Indonesia. Butt 
and Lindsey distinguish between ‘internal illegality’ and ‘external illegality’. 
The former covers illegal actions by judges themselves in the discharge of 
their judicial functions, typically in the form of deciding cases not on their 
merits but on the basis of corrupt payments. The latter concerns the judicial 
endorsement of illegal acts performed by other agents of the state. On the 
one hand, external illegality may have declined in the post-Suharto period: 
the judiciary has become more inclined to find that certain actions of state 
officials are illegal. (Human rights abuses by military officers constitute an 
important exception.) Internal illegality, on the other hand, is as entrenched 
and pervasive as ever, with judges fighting hard to resist attempts to impose 
external accountability mechanisms on them.
Finally, the connection between insecurity and illegality was strong enough 
that we placed the essays dealing with this problem in a third section of their 
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own. The poverty of the good governance approach to the problem of illegal-
ity is nowhere more evident than in its inability to sense the extent to which 
people’s actions are motivated by fear. Conversely, insecurity is central to our 
political approach to the problem. It is the logical consequence of the internal 
competition that characterizes the state. Hence, the very marginality and le-
gal tenuousness of many of the business activities engaged in by Madurese 
migrant entrepreneurs in East Kalimantan is what drives them into the arms 
of the police as both protectors and exploiters (Nooteboom). The racketeers 
Ian Wilson describes are not simply entrepreneurs engaged in a benevolent 
market. They are engaged in a frequently violent struggle for political mastery 
over territory. Nor does it help to view their activities as evidence that the state 
is weak. On the contrary, they owe their strength to the superior repressive 
capacities of their ‘backers’ within the state apparatus. The irony of predatory 
violence emanating from the state whose most basic function is to keep citi-
zens safe is a most pressing reason to review mainstream views of the state. 
The failure of the mainstream discourse on the state can have serious practical 
consequences. This is evident in Jun Honna’s chapter on the international dia-
logue about transnational crime. The discourse permitted Indonesia’s security 
agency charged with the ‘war on drugs’ to argue effectively for increased in-
ternational funding in the name of capacity building, while shielding it from 
the consequences of the state’s own involvement in drug crimes. 
The idea in this book was not to cover every conceivable sector or aspect 
of illegality, but rather to explore patterns that may be common to many sec-
tors. Readers may object that some key sectors – fisheries, for example – have 
been neglected. Our book also does not deal at length with certain aspects of 
illegality that are arguably crucial, among them gendered aspects of illegal-
ity, and the role of customary law (adat) as an alternative source of notions of 
legality. Nor, as already pointed out, did we seek to achieve a uniform view 
of the correct meaning of the inter-penetration of the state and illegality. 
Nevertheless, we think that the volume contributes a breadth of discussion 
that is rarely found in analyses of state illegality and corruption, suggesting 
new avenues for future research, and pointing toward new ways of thinking 
about the topic. The following pages abstract from the essays in this collection 
what we, the editors, think are among the most important insights into the 
subject of illegality and the state in Indonesia. 
The ubiquity and centrality of illegality to the state
If we hope this book will convey one simple message it is this: illegality by 
state officials is as central to the way that the state operates in Indonesia as 
are the formal rules and bureaucratic structures that constitute the state on 
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its surface. It should thus be a central task of scholars to integrate consid-
eration of such illegal practices into the way that we conceive and analyse 
the Indonesian state. Although, as we have noted, much of the literature on 
corruption in Indonesia points to its ‘entrenched’ and ‘pervasive’ character, 
too often the discussion remains trapped in a limiting normative framework 
that takes either positive law or idealized notions of good governance as 
their starting points. It thus sees corrupt or illegal activities by state officials 
as aberrations.17 In reality, if there are pockets in state institutions where 
formal bureaucratic procedures and legal rules are scrupulously observed, it 
is these pockets that are the aberrations, not the illegal practices that are so 
ubiquitous. The levying of illegal taxes on students by school principals who 
need the money to buy protection or promotions from their supervisors; the 
collusive networks that determine how government construction contracts 
are awarded, the cooperative arrangements that local police officers system-
atically build with local gangsters: these practices are not just an aberration 
or an undermining of the state, they are the state.18 
The political character and functions of illegality
Another lesson to be derived from this book is that it is essential to under-
stand illegality by state officials through a political, rather than merely a 
legal, lens. Political structures and arrangements shape the ‘syndromes of 
corruption’ (Johnston 2005) that are experienced in different countries, and 
Indonesia is no exception. Of course, involvement by state officials in illegal 
behaviour frequently involves personal enrichment as one of its goals, but 
making this mundane observation does not get us very far. More important-
ly, our contributors also show that such illegality almost invariably occurs as 
part of collective, patterned, organized and collaborative acts, linked to the 
competition for political power and access to state resources. Understanding 
illegality in this way is helped by viewing the state less as a bureaucratic 
machine and more as a field of power characterized by competition and inse-
curity. Particular instances of illegality by state officials can almost always be 
viewed as connected to the distribution of material resources and political op-
portunities. These goods pass up, down and sideways through and along the 
patron-client networks and alliances that pervade state institutions and that 
crisscross the boundary between state and society. Some of the contributions 
in this volume demonstrate this dynamic clearly. The political problem of 
purchasing internal cohesion in an insecure system riven with competing fac-
17 As already noted, one important exception is Lindsey 2001; see also Lindsey and Dick 2002.
18 The authors would like to thank Ward Berenschot for this formulation.
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tions is central to Ross McLeod’s evocative essay on the ‘Suharto franchise’. 
In McLeod’s analysis, the New Order strongman encouraged officials to ‘live 
off the land’ in order to retain their loyalty. Since all of them were guilty of le-
gal transgressions, he could easily threaten to exclude any of them from these 
perks by waving the rule book. As in a commercial franchise, incumbents 
were free to use their wits for their own self-advancement, while preserving 
the trappings of uniformity. In Howard Dick and Jeremy Mulholland’s essay 
on political slush funds, rivalry between elite factions is again the opera-
tive principle, with slush funds providing the fuel that powers that rivalry, 
but also the resources that buy elite cooperation and social peace. Many of 
the close local case studies in the book also point to the ubiquity of political 
motives in illegality: petty gangsters act as muscle in electoral and other po-
litical conflicts (Wilson, Nooteboom), small-time contractors are drawn into 
political networks and fund election campaigns if they want to succeed in 
the construction field (Mietzner, Van Klinken and Aspinall). Indeed it might 
be possible to argue that the vast majority of illegality by state officials in 
Indonesia concerns the construction of political networks, specifically involv-
ing the purchase of political protection or access from above, or the purchase 
of political support or acquiescence from below, or to exclude rivals laterally.
There is of course also an exclusionary element and a class dimension to 
these bureaucratic politics that we should not lose sight of. Those with power 
to allocate state resources not only distribute them to buy support from above 
and below, but in doing so, they inevitably block access to actors who lack 
such privileged access. Those who are not part of the network find it hard to 
get jobs, their communities receive school buildings and bridges that crumble 
before their time, and they resent those who do manage to build privileged 
access. It is precisely for such reasons that condemnation of corruption re-
mains a powerful rallying cry in Indonesian political life. It explains why 
local anti-corruption groups try to focus their campaigns on increasing com-
munity awareness about the effects of corruption and on opening up chan-
nels for them to participate more fully in the political process. 
The benefits of illegality
Yet awareness of the exclusionary and hierarchical framework that organizes 
much illegal behaviour by state officials should not blind us to the wider inte-
grative and stabilizing functions that such behaviour may also have. Indeed, 
one of the revelations that was shared by most participants in the workshops 
that gave rise to this book was that many of the illegal practices we discussed 
had aspects that could be described as socially beneficial. Particularly at the 
lower end of the social ladder, they sometimes seemed essential to the proper 
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functioning of the state and provided benefits even to marginal groups. 
Sometimes those benefits occur in an exploitative context: the petty collu-
sion between police and small-time entrepreneurs in East Kalimantan that 
Gerben Nooteboom describes costs the latter 5-15% of their turnover; but it 
also helps them get around many obstacles that would otherwise impede 
their activities. Police collaboration with criminals also, as Nooteboom ar-
gues, allows the police ‘to keep criminality under control’, an outcome that 
arguably has wider social benefits. Collusive favouritism and networks of 
illegality can provide working solutions to difficult problems. These include 
how to facilitate the speedy and convenient exit from Indonesia by would-be 
migrant workers (Ford and Lyons), or how to ensure that volatile and poten-
tially violent ex-combatants are satisfied with the outcome of a peace process 
by giving them a stake in the existing system (Van Klinken and Aspinall). 
Indonesia’s shadow state may be an alternative to a smoothly functioning, 
Weberian taxation and policing system. Precisely because it is a state that is 
based on personal contacts and networks rather than impersonal hierarchies 
and rules, it is also a system that gets lots of things done.
The blurring of the state-society boundary
The next point follows logically from our earlier one about how much illegal 
activity by state officials takes place in networks that both pervade the state but 
also cut across the boundary separating formal state institutions from society. If 
we view the hidden illegal practices of the state as being as central to its func-
tioning as the bureaucratic structures and procedures that appear in the formal 
sphere – and we do hold this to be so – and if these practices involve alliances, 
networks and partnerships that cross the state-society divide, then it follows 
that our conceptual boundary between state and society begins to break down. 
At the very least, thinking seriously about state involvement in illegality helps 
us to think of the state as being socially embedded. As Joel Migdal has written, 
the presence of behaviours like ‘corruption’ and ‘criminality’ by state officials 
might in fact reflect the influence of alternative moral codes derived from soci-
ety. This might lead us to re-think our image of the state:
Various parts or fragments of the state have allied with one another, as well as 
with groups outside, to further their goals. Those practices and alliances have 
acted to promote a variety of sets of rules, often quite distinct from those set 
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sharp demarcation between the state as preeminent rule maker and society as 
the recipient of those rules. (Migdal 2001:20.) 
Certainly, the following pages provide many illustrations of this dynamic at 
play. In particular, they illustrate just how many state (or at least state-like) 
functions in Indonesia (for example, the levying of ‘taxes‘, the redistribution 
of material resources, the maintenance of order and suppression of certain 
forms of criminality) are carried out not simply by state institutions in their 
formal, bureaucratic mode, but by networks of state and societal actors, in 
which both sides are engaging in activities that are formally illegal. 
The licitness of illegal activities
Another theme that recurs in the chapters that follow therefore concerns the 
social legitimacy or ‘licitness’ (Abraham and Van Schendel 2005) of much of the 
illegal behaviour that we discuss. Many of our contributors draw attention to 
what we have already indicated is one of the striking characteristics of illegal 
behaviour by state officials: its often brazen openness. As Marcus Mietzner 
puts it in his chapter on elections: ‘many politicians, entrepreneurs and rent-
seekers simply ignore the law and expect that nobody will notice or care’. In 
some cases, as in those depicted by Mietzner and by Widoyoko, political apa-
thy on the part of citizens accounts for their passive acceptance even of activity 
that may be disadvantageous to themselves. They are habituated to a system 
where everybody knows the formally illegal acts in question are unlikely to be 
punished. In such cases, state illegality may be illicit, or socially disapproved, 
yet still ubiquitous and open. However, another explanation is provided in 
chapters by John McCarthy and by Michele Ford and Lenore Lyons. These 
explore how societal actors and state officials in Indonesia’s regions cooperate 
to build mutually beneficial local regimes, for example to regulate logging and 
migration. Both parties view the central government’s rules as intrusive and 
antagonistic to local needs. Both of these accounts portray the central state as 
a predatory outsider, a hostile leviathan, that does not understand or connect 
with the real social world at the grassroots, a world in which low-ranking lo-
cal state officials are immersed, adopting its rules and seeing its interests as 
their own. In such accounts we see conflict between local regimes of licitness 
and state legality, as well as conflict between the state’s commanding heights 
at the centre and its socially embedded functionaries at the local level. In yet 
other chapters licitness differs between insiders and outsiders. Simon Butt and 
Tim Lindsey point to modes of illegal behaviour in and around the judicial or-
gans where insiders apparently adhere to reasonably well-regulated rules and 
norms, while outsiders, from whom these behaviours are hidden, regard them 
 The state and illegality in Indonesia 27
disapprovingly and call their practitioners the ‘judicial mafia’. In such cases we 
may perhaps speak of ‘insider’s licitness’. All of this is to reinforce a point we 
have already made above, namely, that we hope this book will help to prompt 
future research into the internal modalities that shape state officials’ involve-
ment in illegal activities and, we might add, how those modalities intersect 
with broader societal norms concerning the licitness of such activities.
Policy implications
Few of the contributors to this book are deeply engaged in the work of mak-
ing policies or building institutions designed to combat corruption or other 
forms of illegal activities by state officials. As students of the deep structures, 
quotidian practices and social embeddedness of state illegality in Indonesia, it 
is perhaps not surprising that when we turned to the global discourse of good 
governance that has now become so dominant in shaping the fight against 
corruption in the country, the overwhelming instinct of most participants in 
this project was to stress the difficulties that beset that fight and the ironies 
that occur when the global good governance discourse is translated into prac-
tice. Most good governance anti-corruption strategies aim to depoliticize the 
state, to reduce the ‘fight’ to a technical operation. Here, cleanliness is to be 
achieved by separating vested interests from decision-making processes and 
by empowering oversight and investigatory agencies to enforce the law and 
police the probity of state officials (see Dick 2002). We feel the pervasiveness 
of illegality makes this a process fraught with difficulty. Very often the new 
regulations and institutions simply end up providing new opportunities for 
predation. No clearer example exists in Indonesia than the decentralization 
legislation passed in 1999. The legislation was intended to bring government 
closer to the people and thus make it more accountable, more responsive and, 
by implication, cleaner. Yet, as is widely known, decentralization also pro-
vided manifold new opportunities for local actors to engage in novel forms 
of predation. A similar example, given in this volume, is reform of school 
governance in the education sector (Widoyoko). Moving control of funds to 
the schools simply shifted the locus of corruption to the school level. Reform 
of government procurement is another case (Van Klinken and Aspinall). By 
creating a new class of supervisory consultants empowered to ensure that 
projects proceed on track, it created a new layer of predators in the system. 
In a slightly different vein, global discourses of good governance and crime 
prevention, and the funding support they promote, can readily be turned 
by state actors to their own, often particularistic interests. We see this in Jun 
Honna’s analysis of how Indonesian security agencies seized upon new inter-
national discourses about transnational crime to expand their own authority.
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Instead of trying to depoliticize corruption and the fight against it, we ar-
gue for accepting that both are political processes. The key to progress – even 
if it is by necessity very slow progress – will be in making politics accountable 
to a broader public. This requires greater politicization, not less. As Michael 
Johnston (2005:3) has argued, 
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ing interests.
Combating corruption and other forms of illegality thus requires what has 
been called in another context a transition ‘from clientelism to citizenship’ 
(Fox 1994). Such a transformation – still in many respects a distant dream in 
Indonesia – would require a new form of socially embedded state: one that is 
embedded not in webs of clientelism and particularistic dependency, but in a 
politically engaged citizenry.
